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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal from the Judgment 
entered by the Third District Court, Judge Frank Noel after a bench trial under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 11, 1994 the duly elected Board of Directors of BioElectric, Inc., a 
Nevada corporation now called NexMed, Inc. adopted a resolution to issue 2,500,000 
shares (the "Disputed Shares") of the corporation's common shares to Genie Total 
Products, Inc., a corporation controlled by defendant Clealon B. Mann (Exs. 18 through 
20; Amended Appendix to Appellant's Brief p.p. 108 through 118). Subsequently, the 
resolution was changed to substitute Somerset Group, Inc., another corporation controlled 
by Mann, as the recipient of the shares. On April 6, 2000, six years later, the Board of 
Directors of NexMed adopted a resolution cancelling the Disputed Shares (Ex. 29; Liu 
Transcript p. 66). By its complaint herein, NexMed sought a declaratory judgment 
validating the NexMed Board's cancellation of the shares. The trial court found in favor 
of Mann and dismissed all NexMed's claims. Judge Noel issued a 14-page Memorandum 
Decision on August 28, 2003 ®. 9 12-925). Findings of Fact were signed on February 9, 
2004 and entered nunc pro tunc to February 4, 2004 ®. 1040-50); and final Judgment was 
entered on February 4,2004 ®. 1040-50). 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1992 Mann acquired effective control of a corporation shell known as Target 
Capital, Inc. by purchasing 100% of the outstanding shares of Genie Total Products, Inc. 
whose only asset was 1,250,000 shares of Target, its largest outstanding block of shares 
(Tr. 26). He began seeking a business opportunity for Target and was introduced to Peter 
Lathrop who had invented an electronic devices for the treatment of Herpes Simplex and 
cold sores (Tr. 46; 52). On or about December 17, 1993 an Asset Purchase Agreement 
was entered into in which Lathrop and co-inventor Steven Johnston sold their patent to 
the device to Target in exchange for 4,350,000 common shares of Target (Ex. 3). Mann 
had an agreement to act as a consultant for Target (Ex. 22) and was acting in such 
capacity during his negotiation of this contract on behalf of Target (Tr. 66). The 
agreement required approval by Target's stockholders and a Proxy Statement dated 
January 7,1994 was sent to the stockholders calling a meeting for January 18, 1994 (Ex. 
P-9). The Statement called for stockholders to adopt resolutions to (1) approve acquisition 
of the Herpes Device Acquisition Agreement, (2) change the name of the corporation to 
BioElectric, Inc. and (3) elect Peter Lathrop, Steven Johnston and Cherie Castleberry 
(Lathrop's wife) as the directors of the corporation. The stockholders approved all 
resolutions (Ex. P-10). The Proxy Statement stated twice that Target had agreed to enter 
into a consulting agreement with Somerset Management, Inc., controlled by Clealon 
Mann, whereby Somerset would supply consulting services to BioElectric for a period of 
2 
three years in exchange for 2,500,000 shares of stock ®. 60, 61). Stockholders were not 
asked to approve this agreement. 
Thereafter Lathrop and his cohorts assumed control of BioElectric and Mann 
continued to act as a consultant to the company. On April 11, 1994, the directors all 
signed a consent resolution directing the issuance, among other shares, of 4,000,000 
shares to Lathrop, 350,000 shares to Johnston, and 2,500,000 shares to Genie Total 
Products, Inc. (P-18; Tr. 308). Subsequently, the resolution was altered to change the 
recipient of the Genie shares to Somerset, a change consistent with the description of the 
arrangement contained in the Proxy Statement. Lathrop attested that all the directors 
signed a copy of the amended resolution (Tr. 308), Johnston did not recall, but said it 
didn't matter to him who the recipient was (Tr. 404). Castleberry said she only signed 
Ex. P- 18 but not the altered resolution, stating that she would have had questions as to 
why shares were being issued to Somerset (Tr. 464-67). The shares were subsequently 
issued in the name of Somerset. 
Mann continued to perform consulting services for BioElectric (Tr. 317-18) until 
he was terminated by Lathrop by letter on July 26, 1994 (Ex. P-25J. Lathrop detailed the 
services performed by Mann in exchange for his shares (Tr. 306, 316-18), testified that 
the Board considered the consideration fair (Tr. 316), and affirmed the Board's view that 
Mann had fairly earned all the shares he received (Tr. 319). 
Six years later the Board of Directors of NexMed cancelled the Somerset shares 
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and subsequently, brought this case seeking judgment that the cancellation was lawful and 
effective to cancel the shares. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant's Brief in this case purports to present nine primary issues for review, 
the first three of which are divided into numerous titled sub-sections. 
Issue I. NexMed claims that there was no agreement under which the 2,500,000 
issued to Somerset Group, Inc. (the "Disputed Shares"), a corporation which, together 
with Genie Total Products, Inc. was controlled by Clealon Mann. Appellees (hereafter 
jointly referred to as "Mann") will show that an agreement to issue the Disputed Shares 
was made as part of a series of agreements made between Target Capital (the name of 
which was subsequently changed to BioElectric, Inc. and thereafter to NexMed, Inc.), 
Peter Lathrop and Steven Johnston, by which Target acquired a Herpes Treatment Device 
in exchange for 4,350,000 shares and elected Lathrop and Johnson and Lathrop's wife as 
the directors of the corporation. Stockholders were provided with notice of the Somerset 
agreement (though the stockholders were not asked to vote on it) in a Proxy Statement 
presented in connection with a stockholders' meeting held on January 28, 1994. Most of 
this issue is devoted to challenging the adequacy and accuracy of the findings of fact 
entered by Judge Noel in ruling for Defendants in the trial court. Mann will demonstrate 
that the court's findings, coupled with a Memorandum Decision in which the Judge 
explained his decisional rationale, were adequate under the law and amply supported by 
4 
the evidence. 
Issue II. NexMed argues that the ostensibly non-existence agreement to issue 
shares to Mann was barred by the Asset Purchase Agreement entered into between Target 
and Lathrop and Johnston on December 17, 1994. Mann will demonstrate that Lathrop 
and Johnston (the parties the warranties were designed to protect) actually issued the 
Disputed Shares as officers and directors of BioElectric, and must therefore be deemed to 
have waived the provisions. We will also demonstrate that none of the provisions relied 
upon were breached by the Disputed Share agreement. 
Issue HI. NexMed next claims that the issuance of the Disputed Shares violated 
NRS 78.211 because there is no record of the fact that the directors valued the 
consideration Mann delivered for the shares and found it to be adequate. Mann will 
demonstrate (1) that the statute does not require that a record be made of the Board's 
evaluation; (2) that the directors did review the consideration for which the shares were 
issued and found that it was fair to the corporation; and (3) that because the subject 
provision does not contain a penalty clause, it cannot be used as an excuse to void the 
shares, especially when the directors of the issuer were responsible for any breach of the 
provision that may be found. As to NRS 78-315, Mann will argue that since all three 
directors admitted signing a resolution to issue 2,500,000 shares to Genie Total Products, 
Inc., the Board did properly authorize the shares under the subject code section 
notwithstanding a change in the recipient of the shares which made no difference to the 
5 
issuing corporation. 
Issue IV. NexMed next complains that Mann failed to meet his burden, under 
Nevada law as a fiduciary of BioElectric, to prove that his transaction with the 
corporation was in good faith, at arms length and fair to the corporation. Mann will argue 
that (1) Mann was under no such obligation because he was not in control of BioElectric 
when the shares were issued and that in any event, the consideration he paid for the shares 
was adequate and fair to the corporation. 
Issue V. Judge Noel ruled that a Business Consulting Agreement between Genie 
Total Products, Inc. (Mann) and Target Capital was irrelevant to the issues before the 
Court. Mann will argue that Judge Noel's ruling was correct because though the Business 
Consulting Agreement (Ex. 22) may have been relevant in providing factual background 
to the entire course of events, it was not relevant because (1) it did not provide for the 
issuance of any shares to Mann or his companies, and (2) because NexMed utterly 
breached that agreement by making none of the payments required by it. 
Issue VI. Mann will demonstrate that NexMed's argument that there is a basis 
under NRS 78.211(4) to apportion the disputed shares because they were issued for future 
consideration is incorrect because NexMed and its predecessor failed meet any of the 
requirements necessary to bring the case within the purview of the statute. 
Issue VII. NexMed claims that the trial court erred by considering NexMed' s six-
year delay in acting to rescind the Disputed Shares in concluding that its cancellation of 
6 
the stock was improper. Mann will argue and cite authority to demonstrate that delay is a 
fact which is relevant to resolution of the issue. 
Issue VIII. NexMed claims the trial court erred in not admitting an unresolved 
fraud indictment against Mann under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence in 
support of its claim that Mann procured the signature of Cherie Castleberry on the 
authorizing resolution by misrepresentation. Mann will argue that the Indictment was 
irrelevant because NexMed failed to plead its fraud claim with the particularity required 
by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or preserve it for trial in the Pre-Trial 
Order. 
Issue IX. Finally NexMed complains that the trial court erred by refusing to 
consider the fraud testimony of Castleberry and by rejecting NexMed's fraud claim as not 
having been properly pleaded or reserved. Mann will demonstrate that Judge Noel's 
treatment of both the issue and the supporting testimony was correct because (1) the fraud 
issue was not properly plead or preserved; (2) therefore the Castleberry fraud testimony 
was irrelevant; and (3) that Judge Noel was correct in ruling that even if the issue had 
been properly before the court, the supporting evidence was not credible. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS A LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENT 
FOR THE DISPUTED SHARES AND THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT RELATED THERETO ARE ADEQUATE 
7 
The argument supporting NexMed's first issue does little to address the legal 
adequacy of the Disputed Stock Agreement but is actually devoted to setting forth 
complaints about the trial court's findings of fact. Appellee believes the findings and the 
evidence on which the court relied are more than adequate. 
1, The Purposes of Findings of Fact and the Role of the Court's Memorandum 
Decision. In this case the trial court entered six detailed pages of "Findings of Fact" ®. 
1040-50). NexMed fails to mention that prior to entering its Findings of Fact, Judge Noel 
issued a fourteen page Memorandum Decision ®. 9 12-925) in which he expressed the 
details of his mental processes in entering judgment, with specific reference to the facts. 
A copy of this Memorandum Decision in included herein as Addendum No. 2. This Court 
i 
should not ignore the Memorandum Decision because it is the Court's own expression of 
its decision-making process. In State v. Fazzio, 844 P.2d 995, 1001 (Utah App. 1992), 
this court relied on the memorandum decision entered by the trial court as well as its 
findings of fact. It set forth its very observant rationale for doing so in Footnote 4 to the 
opinion. 
FN4. We are puzzled by the dissent's reluctance to utilize the entire record 
before us. The dissent limits itself to a review of the trial court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. It refuses to accord any value to the trial 
court's memorandum decision. We note that the findings were drafted by 
defense counsel whereas the memorandum decision was authored by the 
judge. We therefore find it more instructive as to the court's reasoning. 
The purpose and need for sufficient findings of fact is described in Rucker v. 
Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979) where the Court held that".. . the findings 
8 
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Taken together as they 
should be, Judge Noel's Findings of Fact and Memorandum Decision do just that. 
2. The Issues and the Findings Entered. The Pretrial Order in this case actually 
preserves only one issue, to wit: whether cancellation of the disputed shares was lawful. 
NexMed claims that the cancellation was lawful because (I) the board failed to evaluate 
the consideration received for the shares as required by NRS 78.211; (ii) the shares were 
issued on an altered document; (iii) the shares were issued without "proper 
authorization:" (iv) Nexmed did not receive adequate consideration for the shares; and (v) 
the shares were not issued in an arms-length transaction because at the time they were 
issued, Mann was in control of NexMed and was required to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the consideration received for the shares was fair and equitable 
to the corporation. For the convenience of the Court, Addendum No. 1 has been prepared 
to set forth the issues and summarize the findings of fact on which the court relied in 
entering judgment for Appellees (hereafter "Mann"). A note is warranted regarding the 
comparatively sparse findings as to the third claim that the disputed shares were not 
"properly authorized." NexMed makes the same claim in its Brief on appeal without 
clearly articulating the basis for it. The trial court apparently believed this assertion was 
based on plaintiffs claim that issuance of the disputed shares was barred by the Assets 
Purchase Agreement. Defendant's believe the third issue is really a conclusion drawn 
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from the other claims made, and that having dealt with the component claims at length in 
the Findings of Fact and the Memorandum Decision, separate findings on the third issue 
were not required. 
3. The Court entered Complete and Adequate Findings and a 
Complimentary Memorandum Decision. The standard for evaluating the adequacy of 
findings of fact is spelled out in detail in Woods Construction Company v. Pool 
Construction Company, Inc., 314 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1963), cited with approval in Bucker 
v. Dalton, supra at 1338. In Woods, the court said: 
A judge need only make brief definite and pertinent findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Elaborate and detailed findings and conclusions are 
not necessary. Trentman v. City and County of Denver, Cob.. 10 Cir.. 236 
F.2d 951. cert, denied 352 U.S. 943. 77 S.Ct. 265. 1 L.Ed.2d 239: Life 
Savers Corp. v. Curtiss Candy Co.. 7 Cir.. 182 F.2d 4. The proper guide for 
trial judges is succinctly stated in 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2d Ed.), § 
52.05 (1), page 2644, in footnote 9: 'While the degree of particularity must 
necessarily be gauged to the case at hand, it should be sufficient to indicate 
the factual basis for the ultimate conclusion.' Accordingly, findings of fact 
must be made by the trial judge as to each and every issue raised by the 
parties and remaining before him at the conclusion of the trial. The trial 
judge is not required to follow any particular form in making findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. They may be contained in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision. 
Id. at 406-07. See also Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 43 
(Utah 2003). In this case, Judg Noel was aware of his responsibility to enter findings and 
stated, in his Memorandum Decision, that "The Court will make a finding throughout this 
Memorandum Decision as to those facts that are in dispute by the parties and are 
necessary for a ruling in this case." ®. 913). Pursuant to that commitment, and in full 
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compliance with the applicable standard, Judge Noel entered the Findings of Fact and a 
Memorandum Decision summarized in Addendum No. 1 which dealt with each and every 
issue preserved by the Pre-Trial Order. They resolve contested issues of fact, specify in 
detail the facts upon which the Court relied in resolving each issue, and clearly set forth 
the legal reasoning on which the Court relied in entering judgment for defendants. 
4. The Court's Findings were Adequate Regarding the Agreement for the 
Disputed Shares, As NexMed reports, in his Fourth Finding of Fact Judge Noel found 
that there was an agreement between Lathrop and Johnston and Clealon Mann that Target 
would acquire the Herpes Device for 4,350,000 shares and Mann would get 2,500,000 
shares for kickstarting the company. NexMed now claims that there never was any such 
agreement. Its problem at this stage of the proceedings is that it failed to preserve the non-
existence of the agreement in the Pre-Trial Order and, though it made all kinds of other 
claims that Mann's (though not Lathrop and Johnston's) shares were properly cancelled 
six years later, the contract issue was not tried to the court. Accordingly, no findings of 
fact on that issue were required. 
The parties to the agreement referred to in Finding No. 4 ®. 1041) apparently had 
no trouble accepting that the agreement had been made or understanding what it required 
because both sides fully performed their obligations thereunder. In December 1993 Mann 
got his Board of Directors in Target to agree to acquire the Herpes Device for 4,350,000 
shares, retained counsel to prepare the required documents to close the acquisition, and 
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voted in favor of it at the stockholders' meeting where, also according to the agreement, 
Lathrop, Johnston and Castleberry were elected as the sole directors of the company. For 
their part, Lathrop and Johnston (along with Castleberry) signed a unanimous consent 
resolution awarding 2,500,000 shares to Mann's corporation Genie Total Products soon 
after they were installed as directors. The Proxy Statement, apparently drafted by 
NexMed's present lawyer, provides as follows: 
SUMMARY OF THE AGREEMENT 
The directors authorized the Company's president to execute the 
Agreement with Sellers. The Company under the Agreement is purchasing 
all rights to Patent Number 5,133,352, a Herpes Treatment Device (the 
"Asset") from Dr. Peter Lathrop and Steven K. Johnston for 4,350,000 
shares of its restricted common stock Target has agreed to enter into a 
consulting agreement with Somerset Management, Inc., whose president is 
Clealon Mann whereby Somerset will provide consulting services to the 
Company for a term of 3 years and will receive a total of 2,500,000 shares 
of restricted common stock. 
(Amended Appendix to NexMed's Opening Brief, p.p. 60 and 81.) The required shares 
were issued (Amended Appendix p.p. 108-110). Mann performed the consulting services 
required of him until Lathrop terminated his contract in July 1994 (Tr. 316-19; Exhibit D-
62; Tr. 399-402). The agreement was duly made and entered into by its parties and fully 
performed to their mutual satisfaction. Even if findings on this issue had been required, 
the Court would have been compelled on the evidence to find that the agreement 
described by NexMed's counsel in the Proxy Statement was made and performed. 
5. The Court's Findings are Not Internally Inconsistent NexMed claims the 
court's findings are internally inconsistent. However its opening gambit on this issue 
12 
misquotes the court by adding the words "past services" to its finding that part of the 
consideration for the disputed shares was Mann's role In kickstarting the company. The 
Court said no such thing. The second gambit is that the original agreement was to provide 
shares to Mann, whereas the Proxy Statement proilosed to issue the shares to Somerset, a 
corporation controlled by Mann, The two statements are entirely consistent because either 
way, the shares were controlled by Clealon Mann (Tr. 148, 152). As to the third gambit, 
the allusion in the Proxy Statement to the fact that the disputed shares were to be issued 
for 36 months of consulting services does not "chang[e] the consideration from past 
services to future services" because the statement does not specify when the 36 months 
was to begin or end. Based on all the evidence, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
this period covered the whole period after Mann acquired his interest in Target in 1992, 
spent time seeking a business for it, and included the entire period Mann was involved 
with Lathrop in bringing the Herpes Device into the company. The service period did not 
end until Mann was terminated in July 1994. That construction would be entirely 
consistent with the court's #13 that according to two of the directors, Mann had filly 
earned and paid fair value for the disputed shares before he was fired. These findings are 
not internally inconsistent. 
6. The Court's Findings on the "Agreement" for the disputed shares are 
Supported by the Evidence and the Applicable Law. NexMed creates a separate issue 
based on the same basic assertion by claiming that Judge Noel's findings of fact are 
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inadequate to justify judgment that an agreement to issue the disputed shares existed. We 
once again have a situation where NexMed raises on appeal an issue not preserved by the 
Pre-trial Order and not specifically tried to the lower court. It is improper for NexMed to 
raise the issue for the first time on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
App. 1987). See also, Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company, 659 
P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
NexMed claims that the court's finding that an agreement existed for issuance of 
the disputed shares was not supported by the evidence. It seems to argue that the Asset 
Purchase Agreement between Lathrop and Johnston and Target (Ex. P-3), the Business 
Consulting Agreement between Genie and Target (Ex. P-22), the agreement described in 
the Proxy Statement (Ex. P-9) and the adoption by the Bio-Electric Board of the consent 
resolutions of April 11,1994 which authorized the issuance of the disputed shares (Exs. P. 
18, 19 and 20) should all viewed in isolation as being separate and unconnected - and that 
to be enforceable, each agreement must be supported by separate consideration. Judge 
Noel impliedly rejected that construction (Finding #4, #6 and #13) correctly finding that 
the contractual relationship between Mann and Lathrop featured at least two agreements 
all of which were part of the same series of transactions for which there was 
adequate mutual consideration. 
NexMed first claims that because Target wasn't a party to Lathrop and Mann's 
December agreement and because Lathrop wasn't then in a position to bind Target, there 
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was no "mutuality of consent" that Target would issue shares in exchange for services to 
be performed by Mann. In describing this agreement Lathrop testified as follows: 
Q. Now, I believe that the date of [the Asset Purchase] agreement is December 
17th of 1993. And at or about this time, had — had you had discussions with Clealon 
Mann related to issuing additional shares of Target as a related transaction to this for 
consulting services to be performed by Mr Mann? 
A. Yes, J do. 
Q. Now, did those discussions precede the signature of this asset purchase 
agreement or did they come later, if you recall. 
A. You know, it's hard to respond to a question like "a discussion regarding," 
because Clealon and I started years before that. And we had discussions on a daily basis. 
So, frankly, its hard for me to pinpoint whether a specific discussion on issuing him 
shares of stock for a particular reason occurred before this document or afterward. It was 
our intention all along to basically — and let me be clear in what I'm savin2 — basically 
split the available shares between us. 
Q. Okay. So you — for your side, you would get a number of shares and Mann 
would get a similar number of shares for his contribution; is that right? 
A. A similar number, yes. 
Q. What was it that Clealon Mann was supposed to do for the Target shares 
that he was to get, pursuant to what was then an oral agreement that you had, I guess? 
A. Oh, quite — quite a list. Raise capital, provide the vehicle for the company 
to 20 into the public venue. 
Q. By that, you mean the shell? 
A. Yeah. That's correct. Business support and financial support, and basic, in 
quotes: "partnership in co-venturing a — an entrepreneurial venture." 
(Tr. 305 - 306; emphasis added.) Tt is conceded that the December agreement by which 
Mann agreed to provide a publicly-held shell corporation and Lathrop agreed to permit 
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the Herpes Device patent to be acquired by Mann's corporation featured an offer and 
acceptance, mutuality of consent between the parties, and adequate consideration in the 
form of commitments to perform certain future acts. Mann believes it is appropriate to 
characterize the December 1993 oral agreement as being in the nature of a pre-
incorporation agreement, that is: an agreement between unincorporated parties 
contemplating the legal formation of a new corporate venture. See, e.g. Spor v. Crested 
Butte Silver Mining, Inc. v. Candelario Metals, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987) where 
the parties signed an agreement contemplating formation of a new corporation and 
specifying that each would become equal shareholders in exchange for contributions to be 
made by each of them. The "new corporation" contemplated by the Lathrop/Mann 
i - . • ' • . . . - . 
agreement was Target reorganized to include the Herpes Device, new controlling 
stockholders and a new Board of Directors. Both parties performed the acts called for by 
the agreement. 
On December 17, 1993 Target adopted the portion of the Lathrop/Mann agreement 
under which Target would acquire the Herpes Device from Lathrop and Johnston, by 
signing the Asset Purchase Agreement (Ex. P-3, Amended Appendix p. 17) which refines 
the prior agreement by specifying that Lathrop and Johnston would get 4,350,000 of the 
"available shares" in exchange for the Herpes Device. Nevada law on corporate adoption 
and performance of pre-incorporation agreements is clear; see Chartbrandv. Barnery 's 
Club, Inc., 380 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1967) where the Court said: 
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Under Nevada law, if a pre-incorporation contract made by 
promoters is within the corporate powers, the corporation may, when 
organized, expressly or impliedly ratify the contract and thus make it a valid 
obligation of the corporation. This is especially true if the agreement 
appears to be a reasonable means of carrying out any of the corporate 
powers or authorized purposes. Alexander v. Winters, 23 Nev. 475, 49 P. 
116, rehearing denied, 24 Nev. 143, SOP. 798. 
NexMed attacks the December 1993 agreement between Mann and Lathrop, and 
the subsequent adoption of elements thereof by Target BioElectric on the ground that the 
consideration for them was illusory and so indefinite that the agreements are 
unenforceable under holdings of Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 199, 2000 UT 7, \ 21 
(Utah 2000) which are quoted at page 20 of NexMed's Brief. What NexMed fails to 
mention respecting Pierce is the paragraph which immediately follows quoted note five, 
which reads: 
It has also been noted, however, that [t]he tendency of the law is to 
avoid the finding that no contract arose due to an illusory promise when it 
appears that the parties intended a contract. Through a process of 
interpretation, in the absence of express restrictions, courts find implied 
promises to prevent a party's promise from being performable merely at the 
whim of the promisor. 2 Perillo & Bender, supra, note 5, § 5.28, at 149. 
Furthermore, we note the general principle of contract interpretation set 
forth in the Restatement: "In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or 
a term thereof,... an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and 
effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which 
leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect" Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 203 (1981) 
NexMed also cites Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 995 P.2d, 357, Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (Utah 
App. 1998) for the proposition that the consideration Mann was to receive for his efforts, 
at least under his December 1993 oral agreement with Lathrop, was "not supported by... 
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sufficient definiteness to enforce an agreement." Brief at p. 20. The line quoted from 
Brown was certainly applicable in that case where this court ruled that lease renewal 
options which did not specify the rental to be paid on exercise or any mechanism for 
computing what it would be were agreements to agree which were too imprecise to be 
enforceable. Thus, this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs complaint 
seeking specific performance under the options, and other relief. We believe reliance on 
that case is misplaced here, and that the quoted language is inapplicable where a series of 
contracts are made between parties who understood and performed their respective 
obligations thereunder. As to that point, attention is called to the "Business Consulting 
Agreement" between Target and Genie Total Products, Inc. (Ex. P-22, Amended 
Appendix p. 120). In a somewhat disorganized series of questions and answers, Mann 
testified in essence that (1) this Agreement, was entered into before the Asset Purchase 
Agreement was formalized so that there was as yet no agreement as to the number of 
shares he was to receive for his services to the consolidated venture (Tr. 108-09); (2) that 
under the agreement, he was to receive $12,500 per month until a chief executive officer 
had been hired for Target (Id.); (3) that the agreement disclosed in the Proxy Statement 
specified the number of to which Mann was entitled and substituted Somerset for Genie 
as the registered owner of the shares (Tr. 115,16); and (4) that as far as he was concerned, 
the consulting agreement referred to in the Proxy Statement for which he was to be 
awarded 2,500,000 shares imposed the same obligations on him as the Genie Business 
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Consulting Agreement (Dc. P-22). Paragraph 1 of the Business Consulting Agreement 
provides describes the required services.: 
1. Consulting Services: The Company hereby employs the 
consultant to perform the following services in accordance with the terms 
and conditions set forth on Exhibit "A" of this Agreement. 
The Consultant will consult with the officers and employees of the 
Company concerning matters relating to the management and organization 
of the Company, their financial policies, the terms and conditions of 
employment and generally any matter arising out of the business affairs of 
the Company. 
On January 18, 1993 when Target's stockholders approved the Asset Purchase Agreement 
and elected Lathrop, Johnston and Castleberry as its Board of Directors, Mann performed 
his obligation to consult on the "management and organization of the Company" which he 
correctly believed embodied his obligations under the subsequent agreement described in 
the Proxy Statement. It still remained for Lathrop, through Target, to perform the 
company's obligation to issue 2,500,000 BioElectric shares to Somerset. See Lathrop 
testimony at Tr. 305. NexMed correctly argues that as described in the Proxy Statement, 
Target's corporate agreement to issue 2,500,000 shares to Mann was at least in part an 
agreement to agree. However, that posture did not persist for long, because on April 11, 
1994, the Board adopted the resolutions contained in Exhibits P- 18 and P- 19 awarding 
Mann, through either Genie or Somerset, the 2,500,000 shares that had been agreed upon 
as part of the pre-incorporation agreement and the more specific agreement described in 
the Proxy statement. This final agreement was apparently never reduced to writing; but it 
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is manifest through the conduct of all the parties that both Mann and the Board of 
Directors of Target, who had by then changed its name to Bio-Electric, Inc., understood 
what Mann was and had been obligated to do in exchange for the shares. Mann continued 
to perform his obligations by raising seed capital for the consolidated venture and 
apparently participating in formulating its business plan and operating regimen until July 
26, 1994 when Lathrop unilaterally discharged him. Evidence of some of the things Mann 
did to meet his consulting obligations during the spring of 1994 are found in Ex. P-12 
(which mentions Somerset), P14, P-15 (Amended Appendix p.p. 100 through 106). 
Exhibit P-24, an affidavit of Clealon Mann dated July 1, 1994 sets forth his view that 
Genie Total Products owned 1,392,856 shares of Bio-electric which it had acquired at a 
cost in excess of $110,000, that sum doubtless representing, among other things, the cost 
at which Mann acquired his interest in the shell corporation he gave to Lathrop. 
The entire course of conduct of the parties as established by overwhelming 
evidence, much of which is not in dispute, establishes that Lathrop, initially for himself 
and subsequently for BioElectric, entered into a series of agreement with Mann and 
subsequently Somerset, pursuant to which Mann would provide a public vehicle for use in 
marketing the Herpes Device, raise money for the venture and provide his business know-
how to the venture as required. Lathrop and Mann agreed that Mann would receive shares 
for his efforts. Mann performed the required services over a period of over six months 
after the agreement had been made and after he had spent over $100,000 acquiring the 
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shell and devoted time to finding Lathrop and negotiating the acquisition of his invention. 
In compensation for those services, the BioElectric Board issued 2,500,000 shares to 
Mann through Somerset. The formal parties to each agreement changed with the changing 
roles of the parties. The agreements, taken together, were fully performed by all the 
parties. 
POINT II. 
THE ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT DOES 
NOT BAR OR VOID THE AGREEMENT FOR 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE DISPUTED SHARES. 
1. The Parties to the Agreements. As a preface to dealing with this issue it must 
be pointed out that NexMed has conveniently ignored the identities of the parties to the 
respective agreements which bear on the question. The parties to the Business Consultant 
Agreement dated December 1, 1993 to which NexMed has referred were Target Capital 
and Genie Total Products, Inc., a corporation which Appellees concede was controlled by 
Clealon Mann on the date of the agreement. The parties to the Asset Purchase Agreement 
dated December 16, 1993 (hereafter "APA") are Target Capital as buyer of the herpes 
device, and Peter Lathrop and Steven K. Johnston as sellers. The parties to the oral 
agreement under which Clealon Mann was to be given 2,500,000 Target shares after the 
APA had been closed (the "Disputed Stock Agreement") were Peter Lathrop, acting as an 
individual about to be installed as the CEO and a Director of BioElectric, and Clealon 
Mann. At the time of the initial oral agreement on this issue, Mann owned a controlling 
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interest in Target; but Lathrop owned no shares of Target and had not directly or 
indirectly been elected or otherwise empowered to act as an officer, director or 
representative of the company. Target Capital cannot be deemed to have been a party to 
that agreement or to have directly or indirectly been bound by it. The identities of the 
parties to these agreements cannot be ignored in dealing with the issues raised by them. 
Paragraph A: The Asset Purchase Agreement does not Bar or Void the Disputed 
Stock Agreement. Plaintiff seems to make two claims in Section A of Part II of its Brief 
(Brief, p. 24) First it claims the trial court should have voided the Disputed Stock 
Agreement because the APA voids any agreement made between December 16, 2003 and 
January 18, 2004. Second, it claims that the court should have excluded activities of 
Mann viewed as consideration for the shares because the APA recited that neither 
Lathrop nor Target was paying any finders' fees in connection with the acquisition of the 
herpes device by Target. Both positions are incorrect. 
a. The APA does not bar Target's agreement to issue the disputed shares. In 
dealing with the following arguments it is important to recall that neither Lathrop nor 
Johnston had any authority to act for or otherwise bind Target when the APA was signed. 
They were not given any such authority until January 18, 1994 when the Target 
stockholders elected them as officers and directors of the company and approved the 
issuance of 4,350,000 shares to them in exchange for the Herpes device. Contrary to 
NexMed's assertion at page 26 of its Brief, the fact that Lathrop and Johnston took formal 
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corporate actions to issue shares to Mann after they became officers, directors and 
controlling stockholders of the company and the Herpes device acquisition was closed, 
could not violate any of Target's warranties regardless of when Lathrop and Johnston 
individually made oral agreements to issue shares to Mann which were not binding on 
Target. Had Lathrop and Johnston violated their oral agreement, Mann would have been 
limited to suing Lathrop and Johnston for the breach, He would have had no claim against 
Target. It also cannot be forgotten that Target's warranties in the APA were for the 
protection of Lathrop and Johnston, not Target. Even if Lathrop and Johnston's decision 
to issue shares to Mann breached some warranties Target made in the APA in favor of 
Lathrop and Johnston, their direct complicity in the decision would have to be read as a 
waiver of the Target warranties. 
NexMed next claims that the Disputed Stock Agreement violated Lathrop and 
Johnston's warranty in paragraph 1(a) of the APA that there were no "liens, charges or 
encumbrances upon the [herpes device]." The quoted phrase is most often used in real 
estate conveyances to prevent the purchaser from purchasing property from his seller only 
to have to discharge undisclosed pre-existing liens or encumbrances. See Webb v. 
Interstate Land Corp., 920 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah, 1996). Utah law defines the phrase as 
follows: 
We have also defined an encumbrance as "any right a third party 
holds in land which constitutes a burden or limitation upon the rights of the 
fee title holder." Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123,1124 (Utah 1984) 
(emphasis added). We have held that "a covenant against encumbrances is, 
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in effect, a covenant to indemnify where the encumbrance is a charge or 
lien against the land which can be extinguished by payment." Soderberg v. 
Holt, 86 Utah 485, 498, 46 P.2d 428, 433 (1935) (emphasis added); see also 
Black's Law Dictionary 473 (5th ed. 1979) (defining an encumbrance as 
"[a] claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to and binding real property.") 
(emphasis added.) 
Neither by its terms nor otherwise can Lathrop's agreement to issue shares to Mann be 
construed as a lien, charge or encumbrance against the herpes device he and Johnston 
conveyed to target because the Disputed Stock Agreement did not give Mann any claim 
to, or charge against the title to the herpes device. Nexmed has held title to the device for 
more than ten years and has not reported any claim having been made against it by Mann 
or anyone else. NexMed's claim on this point is entirely spurious. 
NexMed also claims that compliance with the Disputed Stock Agreement is 
excused by Target's breach of its warranty that there were no outstanding options or 
warrants to purchase its shares other than a letter of intent which is irrelevant hereto. Of 
course, the oral Disputed Share Agreement between Mann and Lathrop who was expected 
to become the president of Target after the herpes device acquisition was closed cannot 
be construed as an existing "warrant or option to purchase common stock" of Target 
when the APA was signed because Target was not bound by the agreement. Furthermore, 
NexMed's claim that the existence of an option or warrant would "wip[e] out any 
possibility of an option or contract in favor of Mann "is utterly groundless because even if 
Mann's "option" had existed, that fact might constitute a breach of the APA on which 
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Lathrop or Johnston might have had standing to sue Target for damages, but would not 
give Target standing to void the allegedly violative option on the basis of its own breach 
of the Agreement. 
NexMed also claims the Disputed Stock Agreement is void because Target's 
Business Consulting Agreement with Genie breached its warranty in paragraph 2(d) of 
the APA that "Target is not a party to any employment contract with any officer, director 
or stockholder. Under the circumstances in this case, that fact cannot void the Disputed 
Stock Agreement for two reasons. First and once again, Nexmed as the successor to 
Target cannot claim its own breach of the APA as a ground on which to avoid the 
company's separate agreement with Mann. The warrantees of Target in the Agreement 
are there to protect Lathrop and Johnson, not Target. As parties to the Agreement, 
Lathrop and Johnson were entitled to waive any of Target's warranties, and have 
obviously done so. They must either have felt that the Genie agreement didn't violate 
Target's warranty or intended to waive it. 
NexMed next seeks to void the Disputed Stock Agreement by relying on the 
integration clause of paragraph 14 of the APA. NexMed's argument is without merit. The 
APA is between Target, as buyer, and Lathrop and Johnston as sellers. Without more, the 
language of paragraph 14 which NexMed quotes on page 25 of its brief puts an end to 
reliance on the integration clause because it only supercedes "all prior agreements and 
understandings between the parties . . . " It does not purport to integrate, and therefore 
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cannot be read to bar any pre-existing agreement Peter Lathrop had with Mann. 
NexMed's reliance on the provisions of paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b) in which Target 
as buyer, and Lathrop and Johnston as sellers, warrant that the representations contained 
in the APA are true and will be true at the close, and that there will have been no material 
changes in the affairs of Target pending the close. Once again, existence of the Disputed 
Stock Agreement between Lathrop, an individual, and Mann could not violate either of 
the quoted representations in paragraph S of the Agreement because the Disputed Stock 
Agreement as it then existed did not involve any commitment by Target. 
2. Paragraph B: The Finders' Fee Issue. NexMed argues that some of Mann's 
actions were typical of those performed by "finders" and that therefore, the "no finders' 
fee" representations of the APA render the Disputed Stock Agreement unenforceable and 
prevent such services from being consideration for the shares. These positions are also 
without merit. 
First, the fact that the warranties in the APA are irrelevant to Lathrop's, and 
subsequently Target's agreement to issue the disputed shares to Mann or Somerset as 
demonstrated in the next preceding section is equally applicable to the "no finders fee" 
issue. Also relevant is the fact that Lathrop and Johnston, both for themselves and as 
elected officers, directors and controlling stockholders of Target, either did not believe 
the "no finders' fee" warranties of the APA were applicable to the Disputed Stock 
Agreement or that they affirmatively waived the representations both for themselves and 
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Target when they issued the shares. 
Second, NexMed argues that by providing a vehicle for "the company to go into 
the public venue" and pulling the deal together, negotiating the acquisition of the Herpes 
Device for the benefit of Target, and by retaining legal services to get the deal done, 
Mann acted as a "finder" within the definitions NexMed provides. Mann does not agree 
that he was a "finder." As the person either in control of or substantially influential over 
Target, Mann acted as a principal rather than as a third party bringing two unrelated 
parties together. He was directly involved in the transaction and, beyond having "found" 
the public vehicle for the transaction, remained directly involved in the transaction by 
hiring lawyers to handle the paperwork, arranging for the cash consideration Lathrop 
required, and raising other money for the deal. Even if Lathrop, Johnston or Mann did act 
as "finders," that would not give Target, now Nexmed, standing to void the Disputed 
Stock Agreement based on the alleged violation. The trial court's failure to have dealt 
with the "no finders' fee" provision of the APA in the findings of fact was not error. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR BY REFUSING TO VOID THE 
DISPUTED STOCK ON THE BASIS OF NRS 78.211 AND NRS 78.315 
NexMed includes several unrelated arguments under its claims based on NRS 
78.21 land NRS 78.3 15. Many of them are inapplicable to the issue raised under the cited 
statutes and redundant of claims made elsewhere in the Brief. 
1. The NRS 78.211 Issue. NexMed has included a copy of NRS 78.211 as in force in 
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1994 at page 1 of its Amended Appendix, including the first sentence of paragraph 2 
which requires the board of directors to determine that the consideration received or to be 
received for shares to be issued is adequate. Judge Noel dealt with this statute in his 
Memorandum Opinion ®. 913-14) where, after noting that NRS 78.211 does not provide 
a remedy for breach, he concluded that the Nevada Legislature could not reasonably have 
intended the section to permit a corporation to cancel shares for which, as here, it had 
received adequate consideration, solely because its own board had been derelict in failing 
to determine the adequacy of the consideration at the time of issuance. NexMed 
challenges these conclusions. Though it concedes that there is no remedy specified in 
paragraph (2) of the statute, it claims that the remedy provided in NRS 78.211(4) when a 
corporation places shares to be issued for future consideration into escrow pending 
receipt of the consideration should be engrafted onto paragraph (2). This Court rejected a 
very similar claim in Zoll & Branch P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah, 1997) in 
construing section 34-28-5(1 )(a) of the Utah Code which imposes a civil penalty on 
employers refuse to pay wages due to employees within specified time periods after 
written demand for payment has been made. The counterclaimant in that case claimed he 
was entitled to the penalty. The Court disagreed, concluding that the penalty clause 
applies only to situations where the employer separates (terminates or discharges) an 
employee and fails to pay that employee accrued wages within twenty four hours of a 
demand, As written, the penalty clause does not apply to instances where the employer 
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fails to pay wages due employees who quit or whose work was suspended as a result of an 
industrial dispute. The limitation is in the language itself this Court of appeals refused to 
apply the penalty in a different situation. Under this precedent, Judge Noel's conclusion 
about the remedy provision of NRS 78.211 was correct. 
NexMed next points out that the consent resolutions identified as P-I 8 through P-
20 do not specify the consideration received for the shares to be issued and do not reflect 
how the Board valued the consideration and encourages the Court to infer from this that 
the directors violated their statutory obligation to determine the adequacy of the 
consideration received for shares. The un-rebutted evidence at trial proves the contrary. 
Having been asked whether the Board had concluded that what was to be received for the 
stock issued by those resolutions was "reasonable consideration for the number of shares 
being issued/' (Tr. 315) Director Lathrop testified as follows: 
THE WITNESS: Well, having an intimate relationship with three 
members of the board, my wife and my best friend, Steven Johnston, I 
believe we're in pretty good communication, and we decided on these 
numbers and they were representative of what the value was from each 
individual offering their services. 
Q. (By Mr. Barber) And did the board also consideration the 
issue of fairness in making those awards.? 
A. Yes, uh-huh. 
Q. And what was the board's conclusion about whether those 
awards were fair at that time? 
A. P-i8 now. 
Q. Yeah 
A. We felt it was — we felt it was fair and just, yes. We had no 
problem with it. 
What the Board did is exactly what is required by NRS 78.211(2) and NexMed's 
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argument fails on the facts. It also fails as a mailer of law because neither NRS 78.211 
nor any other provision of the Nevada Revised Statutes, nor any relevant case law, 
require that directors recite that they considered the adequacy of share consideration, or 
include any details of their evaluation of the consideration for shares, in written 
resolutions or minutes. The Consent Resolutions at issue in this case meet all the 
requirements of the applicable statute. 
It is notable that in 2001 the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 78.211 by deleting 
the first sentence of paragraph (2) requiring the board to evaluate the adequacy of share 
consideration entirely, leaving the provision that in the absence of fraud, the judgment of 
the board of directors as to the adequacy of the consideration received for shares is 
conclusive as the only component of the paragraph. There appear to be no Nevada cases 
explaining the deletion, but it would be reasonable to conclude that the Legislature 
perceived the same flaws in application of the requirement that led Judge Noel to reject it 
as a ground for cancellation of the disputed shares in this case. 
Furthermore, as Judge Noel found at R. 914, NexMed was once again seeking to 
avoid its obligation to Mann on the basis of its own alleged breach of a procedural 
requirement of the Nevada corporations code. We note that NexMed cites no authority for 
its claim that a violation by NexMed corporation of NRS 78.211 would be grounds to 
void the shares issued pursuant to the April 11, 1994 resolution. This cannot be a surprise 
- for there can be no such authority. Arguments under this section are without merit. 
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2. The NRS 78.315 issue. NRS 78.315 permits corporate boards of directors to adopt 
valid resolutions without a meeting if all its members sign a consent resolution. As 
NexMed notes, there are two forms of the April 11, 1994 resolution authorizing the 
issuance of 2,500,000 shares. Exhibit 18 authorizes that they be issued to Genie Total 
Products, Inc. Exhibit 19 authorizes them to be issued to the Somerset Group, Inc. Mann 
conceded that he made the change but claimed he did so at the instruction of the transfer 
agent when he sought to change the registered owner of the shares from Genie to 
Somerset, another corporation he controlled (Tr. 147). Without having adduced any proof 
of the proposition either at trial or in its Brief, NexMed argues at page 33 that Mann 
actually changed the resolution to conceal his ownership interest because in April 1994, 
the 2.5 Million Disputed Shares represented.., approximately 33 1/3 to 20 percent of the 
Company's issued and outstanding shares. NexMed does not attempt to show why this is 
claim is either correct or relevant. That aside, NexMed appears to claim that since Exhibit 
P-18 was changed, there is no consent resolution authorizing the disputed shares to be 
issued to Somerset. Judge Noel rejected this claim, specifically finding that the Board did 
authorize the issuance of the shares to Somerset ®. at 916). That finding is supported by 
(1) the testimony of Peter Lathrop that he, Johnston and Castleberry all signed separate 
documents one of which resolved to issue the shares to Somerset (Tr. 308); (2) Johnston 
presumed, though he could not specifically recall whether he signed two forms of the 
resolution or one, but stated that "to me, the difference between Somerset and Genie Total 
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Products makes no difference" (Tr. 404). Brett Jenkins, counsel for Target and 
BioElectric, provided evidence which supported the testimony of all the witnesses that the 
change from Genie to Somerset made no difference, and was therefore not material, when 
he stated that even if the shares had actually been issued to Genie, Mann could simply 
have executed a stock power on behalf of Genie, which he controlled, and had the shares 
transferred into the name of Somerset (Tr. 441-42). The Court also found that the 
testimony of Cherie Castleberry related to adoption of the authorizing resolutions was not 
credible and disregarded it. See issues VIII and IX herein. 
POINT IV. 
CLEALON MANN DID NOT HAVE A FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION TO 
BIOELECTRIC OR ITS STOCKHOLDERS WHEN THE DISPUTED SHARES 
WERE ISSUED AND HAD NO OBLIGATION TO PROVE THAT THE 
CONSIDERATION FOR THE SHARES WAS ADEQUATE OR FAIR. 
L Application of the Rule. NexMed relies on the general rule that corporate 
directors or dominant controlling stockholders are fiduciaries vesting with them the 
obligation of demonstrating that their dealings with the corporation were at arms length 
and in good faith, and were fair to the corporation, citing Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument 
Corp., 63 1 F.Supp. 860, 879 (S.D.N.Y., 1986) as authority for the rule. It correctly 
recites that at the trial court initially found that a prima facie case had been made that 
Mann was control of Target and therefore was required to prove the fairness of the 
Disputed Share transaction. However, by the end of the trial, the court overturned this 
decision, explaining and reiterating that decision in paragraph 10 of his Findings of Fact 
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where he reiterates that"... after the shareholders' meeting of January 18, 1994, when 
Johnson, Lathrop and Castleberry became the Board of Directors, that Mann no longer 
had control of the corporation and did not have control at the time the shares were 
actually issued in April of 1994" (Memorandum Decision, page 7 at R. 918). NexMed's 
statement that the basis of the trial court's finding was that Lathrop and Johnston owned 
4.35 million BioElectric shares when the Disputed Shares were issued is not correct; for 
in both his explanations of his finding, Judge Noel also relied on his conclusion that 
Mann did not control the corporation after Lathrop, Johnston and Castleberry were 
elected, and had assumed their positions as the sole directors of the corporation. Reliance 
by the court on that proposition is more than justified by NRS 78.120 which provides that 
"Subject only to such limitations as may be provided by this chapter, or the articles of 
incorporation of the corporation, the board of directors has full control over the affairs of 
the corporation." 
Nevertheless, NexMed asserts that Judge Noel's finding was "wrong at law" 
because"... Mann, through Genie, had an undisputed "controlling interest" in the 
Company up to the actual issuance of the 4.35 million shares of Company stock to 
Lathrop and Johnston. Even then, if Mann had an agreement to the Disputed Shares, 
Mann still had a controlling interest." (Brief at p. 37.) NexMed supports this contention 
by correctly noting that one can be in control of a corporation without ownership of more 
than 50% of its outstanding shares and positing the argument found on Footnote 19 of 
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page 37 of its Brief to the effect that after the issuance of 4,350,000 shares to Lathrop and 
Johnston, and another 2,500,000 shares to Mann, there would have been 12,064,000 
shares outstanding of which Mann would own 31% and Lathrop would own 33%. 
NexMed does not mention that Johnston would in that case own another 2.9% of the 
shares. 
As is noted in the case cited by NexMed, the primal Nevada authority on th 
fiduciary rule is Foster v. Arata, 325 P.2d 759, 764 (Nevada, 1958). By its terms, 
application of the rule as to control by share holding is limited to cases involving a 
"dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders." Id. at p. 765. The case 
does not define the term; but it is helpful to note that the directors who did business with 
the corporation in that case held 1800 of its 3750 outstanding shares; and persons who 
were geographically affiliated with them held another 600 shares, together constituting a 
majority of the outstanding stock. The largest block outstanding against this position was 
600 shares held by plaintiff Foster. In the instant case, Mami held no more than 31% of 
the outstanding shares and was not shown to have had any affiliation with any other 
outstanding shares. Together, Johnston and Lathrop controlled 4,350,000 shares 
comprising over 36% of the outstanding shares. On the basis of his share holdings, Mann 
could not have controlled BioElectric on or after January 18, 1994. 
What is more important is that Lathrop, Johnston and Castleberry comprised the 
entire board of directors of BioElectric on April 11,1994. In that sense, they were in the 
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exact position of the three parties defendant in Foster v. Anita, supra, who, unlike Mann, 
were the officer and directors of the company, and "took control over the complete 
management and operation of the corporation and its affairs." before the questioned 
transaction occurred. Id at 76 1-62. There is no evidence to support the vapid claim of 
NexMed that Mann a "de facto officer of the company." on that date. While it is true that 
Lathrop testified that "I would see him in a — I believe we considered him in a role, in 
today's terms, as the CFO and executive of the company," he does not state any date upon 
which he was of that view. Lathrop's use of the word "role" in this sentence is also 
significant because it implies that though Mann may have performed some tasks similar 
to a CEO at some point, he had no authority to act as such an officer on April 11, 1994. 
The evidence supports the inference that Lathrop would have viewed him in this role 
because he was raising all the funds on which the company was operating from December 
1993 through February 1994 (see Amended Appendix to Appellant's Opening Brief 
Exhibit P-15, page 104). He was not shown to have performed similar acts thereafter. 
Director Johnston testified that the very structure of the deal pursuant to which 
Mann got 2,500,000 shares and Lathrop and Johnston got 4,350,000 shares was to insure 
that "Peter would maintain the controlling stock amount in the company so that he could 
stay in control... "and so that Lathrop, not Clealon Mann, would control the company..." 
(Tr. 3 96-97. Finally, Director Johnston testified that Mann never did anything to 
influence, or attempt to influence how he exercised his control of BioElectric (Tr. 397-
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98). Lathrop went even further: 
Q. All right. Did Clealon Mann, to your knowledge, ever have voting 
control of this corporation? 
A. Which corporation? 
Of Target Capital. 
Voting control? 
Yes. 
No, he didn't. 
When you were on the board of directors, did Clealon Mann have the 
ability to control how you voted as a director? 
No. 
Did he ever attempt to do that? 
No. 
Did he ever use — attempt to use his shareholdings as pressure to -
No. 
— influence your vote one way or the other? 
Not ostensibly, no. 
To your knowledge, did he make any such efforts with other 
directors of the corporation? 
No. 
And did they, as far as you could tell, execute — or exercise 
complete independence from him in determining how to vote their ~ 
Oh, yes. 
— shares as directors: 
I would say. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Tr. 326-27. 
Cherie Castleberry provided further evidence that supported the court's finding that Mann 
did not control BioElectric after January 18, 1994 when she testified that differences 
arose between Mann and the Board and that he threatened to file a minority stockholders' 
action against the Board (Tr. 472-73). Needless to say, if he had been able to control 
BioElectric he could have resolved his concerns and would not have needed to threaten 
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legal action. She also stated that she had no knowledge that Mann controlled the 
corporation (Tr. 487). 
Mann did not control BioElectric on April 11, 1994 when the Board determined to 
issue 2,500,000 shares to him. The trial court's tenth Finding of Fact and its further 
comments in its Memorandum Opinion ®. 918) are correct as a matter of law and are 
overwhelmingly supported by the evidence. Accordingly, Mann had no obligation to 
demonstrate that this transaction was agreed to in good faith or that it was fair to the 
corporation. 
2. Notwithstanding his lack of any obligation to do so, Mann did prove that the 
transaction was negotiated in good faith and at arms length, and that it was fair to 
BioElectric, The trial court's findings and conclusions on this issue are not erroneous. 
NexMed first states that the fairness to the corporation in these cases is to be judged by an 
objective standard. The only support cited for this proposition is US. v. Slceddle, 940 
F.Supp.l 146, 1151 (N.D.Ohio, 1996) which is not applicable because the title of the 
section cited from which the holding is derived is: "The Effect of O.R.C. § 
1701.60(A)(1)," "O.R.C." being the Ohio Revised Statutes. Citation of the case is 
completely inappropriate because there appears to be no case or statute which imposes the 
same standard for issues involving corporate insider self-dealing under Nevada law. The 
Objective Standard NexMed claims should be applied in Section B(l) of its brief is not 
applicable under Nevada law. 
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Moreover, NexMed's claim that Judge Noel relied exclusively on the "'after the 
fact' testimony of two of the three former members of the Board of Directors" in finding 
that the subject transaction was fair is not supported by the record. At page 8 of his 
Memorandum Decision (Record, p. 919), after noting that the fairness of the transaction 
should be judged "in the context of the facts and circumstances at the time the shares 
were issued," Judge Noel found for Mann on the basis that prior to the Herpes Device 
Transaction, Target was an empty shell, without any assets or business prospects, that 
Mann brought to it the only business opportunity it had when the Disputed Shares were 
issued through his agreements and relationship with Dr. Lathrop, and that the device is 
still a viable asset of NexMed's successor which plans to market it. Judge Noel's finding 
and conclusion that the Disputed Share transaction was fair to NexMed is 
overwhelmingly supported by the facts and the law. 
POINT V. 
THOUGH THE EXISTENCE OF THE BUSINESS CONSULTING 
AGREEMENT WAS A RELEVANT EVIDENTIARY FACT, THE 
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS IS NOT RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT WAS NOT ERROR. 
As NexMed notes, the trial court found in paragraph 5 of its Conclusions of Law 
that the agreement "is not relevant to the issues raised herein." ®.1049.) However, before 
drawing this conclusion the court properly admitted substantial testimony from Mann 
about the Business Consulting Agreement which Mann entered into with Target Capital 
and its relationship to the subsequent agreements made with Lathrop and BioElectric (Tr. 
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101-112). In essence, Mann testified that he thought the agreement for 2,500,000 shares 
came later because the number of shares to be awarded had not been decided before the 
proxy statement was drafted, that the reference in the proxy statement to a consulting 
agreement referred to Exhibit 22, and that he felt the two agreements were tandem 
agreements under which he operated as a consultant to Target and Bio-Electric. This 
testimony was all relevant as providing context for all the agreements which had been 
made between the parties. 
However, the trial court's conclusion that the Business Consulting Agreement was 
not relevant to the issue before the Court was correct because (1) the Business Consulting 
Agreement doesn't provide for the issuance of any shares to Mann or his companies, (2) 
Target did not pay any of the consideration called for by that agreement, and (3) nothing 
in the agreement was fatal to Mann's claim to the 2,500,000 shares under an agreement 
subsequently made and carried out by both parties. 
The fact that Mann did not pursue the Business Consulting Agreement after having 
included it in his counterclaim in this case is irrelevant to resolution of the claim 
preserved by NexMed for resolution at trial. 
POINT VI. 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR NEXMED'S CLAIM THAT IF THE 
DISPUTED SHARES WERE ISSUED FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION, 
THE SHARES MUST BE APPORTIONED 
NexMed' s claim that the Disputed Shares should be apportioned under NRS 
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78.211(4) is without merit because, if for no other reason, neither BioElectric or NexMed 
met the requirements of the section which provides: 
4. The corporation may place in escrow shares issued for a 
contract for future services or benefits or a promissory note, or make any 
other arrangements to restrict the transfer of the shares. 
The Somerset shares were not placed in escrow but delivered to Mann immediately 
upon issuance. This being obvious, NexMed comes up with the disingenuous claim that 
the "restricted (sic) legend" imprinted on the face of the Somerset certificate was an 
"arrangement to restrict the transfer of the shares" sufficient to bring them within NRS 
78.211(4). As counsel for NexMed well knows (having represented BioElectric during 
the period when the shares were issued), the shares bore a standard form restrictive 
legend under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, because they were issued without 
registration under the Act in reliance on § 4(2) which exempts transactions by an issuer 
not involving any public offering, and because the use of such a legend is one factor the 
SEC will consider in evaluating whether the transaction was, in fact, exempt. See 
Securities Act Release No.5 121, December 30, 1970. 
It should also be noted that it was not Mann who breached whatever obligation 
there may have been that he act of a consultant for thirty-six months. For in fact, Peter 
Lathrop unilaterally terminated Mann's Consulting Agreements with BioElectric on July 
26, 1994 (Dc. P-25) notwithstanding the provision of paragraph two of the Business 
Consulting Agreement that it could only be terminated by mutual consent. There was no 
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evidence that Mann would not have remained available to serve under the agreement for 
its entire term of not barred from doing so. Lathrop, President and lead Director of 
BioElectric knew that the 2,500,000 shares called for by the company's subsequent 
agreement with Mann had been issued and delivered, and nevertheless took no action to 
reclaim any of the shares. This fact is consistent with Lathrop's testimony that 
notwithstanding the termination, Mann had filly earned the Somerset shares removes any 
possible ground for apportionment of the shares. 
POINT VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY CONSIDERING 
"DELAY" TO RULE AGAINST THE COMPANY 
While Judge Noel more than adequately explained the bases of his judgment in this case 
on other grounds, he did note NexMed's delay in cancelling the Disputed Shares and 
bringing this lawsuit as a factor in his decision. Reliance on this factor was not error. 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines "relevant evidence" as that 
"having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." The trial court explained its rational for believing NexMed's delay in acting to 
recover the Somerset shares was relevant beginning on page 8 of its Memorandum 
Decision®. 919): 
The plaintiffs claim that the company did not receive adequate 
consideration for the issuance of the shares is somewhat belied by the fact 
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that the company, including current officers, have known since at least June 
of 1994 that the disputed shares were held by Mr. Mann in a company he 
controlled, and knew the precise nature of the consideration the company 
received for the issuance of those shares, and yet waited over six years, and 
after Mr. Mann had filed lawsuits against the company on other matters, 
and had filed a Complaint with the Utah State Bar against the company's 
attorney, to make a claim that the consideration received was inadequate. 
Judge Noel went on to deal with NexMed's explanations for the delay, but concluded that 
they were "not compelling" ®. 921) and recited several facts to justify that conclusion. 
In at least one other case this Court has approved of the consideration of delay in 
bringing a claim as a factor in its ultimate judgment. In Brener-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 
799 P.2d 716 (Utah App.,1990), a real estate purchaser brought action against vendor for 
rescission, and vendor cross-claimed against title insurer for negligence. The Second 
District Court, Weber County, Ronald O. Hyde, J., entered judgment for purchaser and 
insurer, and appeal was taken. This Court, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) vendors who 
could not convey unencumbered fee title to property as promised, upon discovery that 
water district had irremediable pipeline easement, were guilty of anticipatory breach of 
contract, thereby entitling purchasers to rescission, and (2) neither title insurer nor 
searching attorney could be held liable to vendor for negligence in failing to discover 
irremediable easement. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision on the breach, but 
reversed and remanded in part, holding that: 
Nonetheless, I would reverse the summary judgment in favor of B-H. I believe the 
five-year delay in asserting a rescission right, during which time payments were made and 
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the contract was twice amended, necessarily poses a material question of fact: Even if 
some time to assess the situation and explore possibilities of mitigation was available to 
B-H after "discovery' of the easement, was five years more than the "reasonable time" the 
law would permit in which to do so? On the record before us, I cannot conclude that five 
years was not an unreasonable delay. (Id. at 733.) 
NexMed's delay in taking action to revoke the Somerset shares was a relevant and 
material factor which Judge Noel properly considered in reaching his decision. There was 
no error in doing so. 
POINT VIII. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT ADMITTING 
THE FRAUD INDICTMENT AGAINST MANN 
NexMed claims that the trial court should have admitted Mann's federal fraud 
indictment in Case No. 2:02 CR 0741 in the U.S. District Court for Utah under Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence to "show that Mann made misrepresentations in 
connection with securities and financial transaction and to corroborate Castleberry's 
testimony." Use of the conjunctive "and" in this statement is ambiguous and confusing 
because it doesn't tell us where or when Mann is alleged to have made misrepresentations 
in this case other than the one he allegedly made to Castleberry. It is most likely that the 
first phrase of the quoted sentence relates to the misrepresentations charged in the 
indictment, not any alleged to have been made in this case. 
Mann's fraud indictment was not admissible under Rule 404(b) in this case 
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because it was irrelevant for the purpose claimed for it. The fraud claim the evidence was 
offered to support was not properly before the Court. No fraud claim was ever pleaded by 
NexMed with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The trial court also properly ruled that NexMed had not preserved the fraud 
claim in the Pre-Trial Order ®. 889, et seq.) At page 5 of his Memorandum Decision 
Judge Noel stated: 
The third director, Cherie Castleberry ... further claimed that Mann 
advised her that the effect of the resolution was simply to transfer existing 
outstanding shares from the name of one corporation to another. NexMed, 
therefore, claims fraud in inducing Castleberry to sign the resolution. This 
claim has not been raised in these proceedings, was not reserved in the 
Pretrial Order as a basis for canceling and rescinding the shares, and 
accordingly, the Court has previously ruled that it will not allow this claim, 
based on Cherie Castleberry's testimony. 
After the trial in which Judge Noel persisted in this ruling, NexMed moved the court to 
reconsider Castleberry's testimony with supporting Memorandum ®. 980). Appellee's 
responded ®. 1003) and NexMed filed a Reply Memorandum ®. 1017). The trial court 
again rejected NexMed's claim by Minute Entry dated January 13, 2004 ®. 1036), 
reiterating grounds previously stated, to wit: that the fraud claim had not been properly 
pleaded or preserved in the Pre-Trial Order, but that even if the claim had been allowed, it 
would have failed because Ms. Castleberry's testimony about Mann's alleged 
misrepresentation or the bases on which she claimed to have justifiably relied on it were 
not credible, NexMed's claim of fraud by Clealon Mann was not properly before the 
Court; and evidence to support that claim was therefore neither relevant nor admissible. 
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We do not believe this Court could reverse on the ground that the trial court 
rejected Rule 404(b) evidence which might possibly and very indirectly support a claim 
that was not before the trial court. Our Court has properly ruled in State v. Allen, P.3rd. _ 
2005 WL 327054, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2005 UT 11, (Utah 2005) that-
Even if evidence is offered for a proper, non-character purpose, a 
court must also determine whether the evidence is relevant under Utah Rule 
of Evidence 402. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at 19, 6 P.3d 1120. 
Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. (Emphasis added.) 
(Id. at 22.) Neither the misrepresentation testimony of Castleberry nor the proffered 
evidence that Mann made mistatements at other times could have made any fact that was 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence. Accordingly, it was properly excluded. 
POINT IX. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS TREATMENT 
OF THE TESTIMONY OF CHERIE CASTELBERRY 
AND NEXMED'S CLAIMS BASED THEREON. 
Director Castleberry testified that she signed Exhibit P-18 (TR. 464) based on 
Mann's misrepresentation that the 2,500,000 shares issued to Genie "were previous 
shares owned and was [sic] being converted over to the new company, BioElectric" (Tr. 
465); that she never signed a resolution to issue 2,500,000 shares in favor of Somerset 
(Tr. 466); and that she'd seen Somerset's name on documents but didn't know it was 
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controlled by Clealon Mann (Tr. 487-88). At page 47 of its Brief NexMed argues without 
citing any authority that the trial count abused its discretion by finding that this claim 
sounded in fraud rather than "misrepresentations or mis-statements" and had not been 
pleaded with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
trial court's ruling was not error; for in Coroles v. Sabey, 79 P.3d 974, 984-05 (Utah App. 
2003) this Court held that: 
The Rule 9(b) requirement should not be understood as limited to 
allegations of common-law fraud.... [I]t reach lies] all circumstances where 
the pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other 
deceptions covered by the term 'fraud' in its broadest dimension."); Doyle 
v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 194 (1st Cir.1996) (affirming the dismissal of 
a conspiracy claim "[b]ecause the plaintiffs-appellants have failed to meet 
the requirements of Rule 9"); Haydukv. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443 (1st 
Cir.1985) ("[W]here fraud lies at the core of the action, Rule 9(b) applies."); Adams v. 
NVR Homes, Inc., 193F.R.D. 243, 250 (D.Md.2000) ('The requirements of Rule 9(b) 
apply to all cases where the gravamen of the claim is fraud even though the theory 
supporting the claim is not technically termed fraud."). 
Accord: Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 972 (Utah, 1982). No 
matter what NexMed calls its claim, it is covered by and failed to comply with the 
particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) as described in detail in Armed Forces insurance 
Exchange v. Harrison, supra, 70 P.3d at 40 None of the required matters were either 
pleaded by NexMed or preserved by it for trial in the Pre-Trial Order. 
At page 48 of its Brief NexMed seems to argue that because Castleberry 
mentioned Mann's alleged misrepresentation in her deposition and testified to it at trial 
without objection or testimonial rebuttal, the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) were 
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somehow suspended. NexMed ignores the fact that Rule 9(b) states a rule of pleading -
not a rule of discovery; and cites no authority for this claim. This is not surprising because 
so far as Appellees can find, no such authority exists. 
The argument on page 49 of NexMed's Brief veers somewhat from its fraud tactic 
and flows seamlessly into an argument that Castleberry's signature on Exhibit 18, and the 
document itself is invalid because "Ms. Castleberry's misunderstanding regarding the 
reason for issuance of the shares to Genie renders her signature to the Unanimous 
Consent Resolution invalid. In his Minute Entry of January 13, 2004 ®. 1037) Judge Noel 
properly lumped NexMed's claims that the court should reconsider the testimony of Ms. 
Castleberry "with regard to mistake, misrepresentation and misstatement" and the 
resulting claim of fraud. The court once again rejected all those claims based on the Pre-
trial Order and its finding that Castleberry's testimony was not credible. Incidentally, the 
record does not reflect tat Judge Noel simply ignored her testimony which, as NexMed 
notes, was admitted without objection. It simply ruled that the fraud claim had not been 
properly plead, preserved, or supported by credible evidence. 
NexMed also asserts that the latter finding was an abuse of discretion. In fact, the 
Court's finding on this issue is supported by overwhelming evidence. First, the agreement 
of BioElectric to issue 2,500,000 shares to Somerset Group, a company controlled by 
Clealon Mann, was the exact agreement described in the Proxy Statement sent to 
stockholders on January 7, 1994 which also described the agreement by which 
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Castleberry and her husband were elected directors of the company. Her protestation of 
ignorance about the deal in the face of a corporate record of which she should have been 
aware is not credible. Second, she testified that she was directly involved between all the 
conversations between Mann and her husband (Tr. 475-76), including the one in which 
Exhibit P-I 8 was discussed and in which Mann told her the Genie shares were previously 
issued (Tr. 465). The likelihood that Mann would have made this statement to her, 
knowing that it was false, in the presence of Lathrop who had negotiated the deal by 
which 2,500,000 new shares were to be issued for Mann's services to Target is so remote 
as to be incredulous. Third, this agreement was not kept secret from Steven Johnston. He 
discussed it with Lathrop, was aware of the services Mann was providing for the shares, 
and testified that Lathrop "said it was absolutely essential to keep [Mann] on board" (Tr. 
400-02). In light of the fact that there was agreement on the issue by two of the three 
directors and that it has been disclosed to stockholders, there is no likelihood whatever 
that either Lathrop and Johnston, or Mann, would have had any reason to 
mislead Castleberry or anyone else about the deal. Finally, though Castleberry may not 
have known anything about Somerset, Johnston made it clear (as did Vivian Liu, current 
representative of NexMed), that to the corporation, it made absolutely no difference who 
Mann vested the shares in (Tr. 404; Partial Transcript of Trial Testimony of Vivian Liu, 
p. 77). There is no reason Castleberry's claimed question about what Somerset did to earn 
the shares could not have been answered to her satisfaction, or that it would logically 
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p. 77). There is no reason Castleberry's claimed question about what Somerset did to earn 
the shares could not have been answered to her satisfaction, or that it would logically 
have made any difference which of the Mann entity became the registered owner of the 
shares. 
The trial court's finding that Cherie Castleberry's testimony that her signature on 
Exhibit P-18 was procured by fraud or a mis-statement by Clealon Mann was not 
credible was overwhelmingly supported by the trial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the final Judgment entered by the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County herein should be affirmed in their entirety. 
Dated this 28th day of March, 2005 
Salt Lake City. UT 84101 
Attorney for Appellees 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
ADDENDUM NO. 1 
In column two, below, "FF" refers to the court's Findings of Fact; "CL" refers to its 
Conclusions of Law; and "MD" refers to Judge Noel's Memorandum Decision of 
August 28, 2003. 
Plaintiffs Claim 
(I) the board failed to evaluate the 
consideration received for the shares as 
required by NRS 78.211; 
(ii) the shares were issued on an altered 
document; 
Relevant Findings 
a. In December 1993 Mann and Lathrop 
agreed that Target would acquire the 
Herpes Device for 4,350,000 shares and 
Mann would get 2,500,000 shares "for 
his work for Target and for kick-starting 
the company. (FF 4) 
b. On April 11,2004 all three directors 
signed Exhibit 18 which authorized the 
issuance of 7,235,714 shares including 
4,350,000 to Johnston and Lathrop and 
2,500,000 to Genie, a company 
controlled by Mann. The resolution does 
not identify or evaluate the consideration 
for the shares. (FF 8) 
c. NRS 78.211 does not provide a 
remedy for its breach. (CL 2(a); MD, 
Record at 913) 
d. Nexmed, not Mann, breached NRS 
78.211. (CL 2(b); MD, Record at 914) 
e. Cancellation of shares issued for 
adequate consideration is not the proper 
remedy for NexMed's Board if 
Directors' dereliction of its duty under 
NRS 78.211. 
a. There is an April 11 resolution 
requiring the 2,500,000 Mann shares to 
be issued to Genie Total Products and 
another copy which requires the shares to 
be issued to Somerset. (MD paragraph 2, 
Record at 914-15) 
b. There is a conflict in the evidence 
about how the April 11,1994 resolution 
was created. Lathrop said he signed both 
resolutions; Johnston couldn't remember 
(iii) the shares were issued without 
"proper authorization." 
(iv) Nexmed did not receive adequate 
consideration for the shares; and 
which he signed, and Castleberry said 
she signed only the first resolution to 
Genie. 
c. Castleberry's testimony that she was 
induced to sign the resolution by Mann's 
fraud was not credible. (FF 11) 
d. Regardless, all three members of the 
3-person Board authorized the issuance 
of the Mann shares. 
d. The court need not resolve the 
conflict about how the change from 
Genie to Somerset was made because 
Lathrop and Johnston, a majority of the 
Board as then constituted, and Vivian 
Liu the current representative of 
NexMed, testified that it the shares were 
issued for the benefit of Mann and that it 
made no difference to the corporation 
who got Mann's shares. (FF 12) 
e. The Board of Directors authorized 
issuance of the shares to Somerset. 
a. The Court finds that the Asset 
Purchase Agreement did not bar Mr. 
Mann from entering into an agreement 
with Target for the issuance of the 
disputed shares. The Court further finds 
that Mr. Mann was never paid any money 
whatsoever under the Business 
Consulting Agreement, and in any event 
the existence of that Agreement would 
not be fatal to Mr. Mann's claim that the 
shares were properly issued. 
a. Evaluation of the adequacy of 
consideration is difficult because what 
one person may deem adequate may be 
inadequate to another. (MD, Record p. 
918) 
b. Two of the three directors who 
authorized the shares felt Mann's 
consideration was adequate. (MD, 
(v) the shares were not issued in an 
arms-length transaction because at the 
time they were issued, Mann was in 
control of NexMed and is required to 
prove that the consideration received 
Record p. 919) 
c. Mann performed services for the issuer 
including negotiating the Herpes Device 
acquisition; retaining legal services to 
prepare the required documents to effect 
the transaction and present it to 
stockholders; financing or raising the 
money to operate the issuer during its 
formation period. 
d. A majority of the Board believed he 
had performed all services required by 
the consulting agreement and believed 
those services were fair value for the 
shares. (FF 13) 
e. Lathrop testified, and the court 
believes that Mann's efforts were of 
significant value in kick-starting 
BioElectric, and probably more 
significant than those of Lathrop and 
Johnston. (MD, Record at 920) 
f. When Mann bought Target it was a 
shell corporation with no assets. (MD 
Record at 919) 
g. When the shares were issued 
BioElectric's only asset was the Herpes 
Device patent acquired solely through 
Mann's efforts. Any value of the shares 
above their par was attributable to Mann. 
(FF 14) 
h. NexMed still maintains the Herpes 
Device and intends to market it in the 
future. (FF 16; MD Record at 919) 
I. NexMed didn't attempt to cancel the 
Mann shares for six years after he had 
made claims against the company and its 
counsel and, though latches was not in 
issue, NexMed knew the shares had been 
issued and had known the consideration 
for which they were issued for years. 
NexMed's explanation for the 6-year 
delay in bringing its cancellation claim 
was not compelling, and weakens its 
was fair and equitable to the corporation. claim. (MD Record at 921-21; FF 17) 
a. From December 1993 through January 
18,1994 Mann was in control of Target 
because he owned the largest outstanding 
block of its stock and had nominated the 
persons who served on its Board of 
Directors. (FF 5); 
b. Plaintiff made a prima facie showing 
that Mann controlled target at the time he 
made his agreement with Lathrop and 
Johnson, including the agreement to 
issue 2,500,000 shares to him, and when 
the proxy statement was prepared which 
disclosed this agreement to the 
stockholders. (MD Record at p. 917) 
c. Mann controlled target until the 
stockholders' meeting on January 18, 
1994. 
d. On January 18, 1994 the stockholders 
adopted a resolution approving the 
issuance of 4,350,000 shares to Lathrop 
and Johnson for the Herpes Device and 
elected Lathrop, Johnston and 
Castleberry as the Board of Directors of 
the company. (FF 7; 
e. Mann did not control BioElectric on 
April 11, 1994 when his 2,500,000 
shares were issued. (FF 10; MD, Record 
at 918) 
f. Therefore, Mann does not have to 
prove the fairness of the transaction by 
clear and convincing evidence. FF 4(d). 
f. Nevertheless, Mann proved by clear 
and convincing evidence that the 
consideration received by BioElectric for 
Mann's shares was adequate and that in 
the context of the facts and 
circumstances existing in 1993-94, the 
transaction was fair to the shareholders. 
(MD, Record at 922; FF 4(c) and 4(d) 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEXMED, INC., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 000902834 
vs. : 
CLEALON MANN; THE SOMERSET : 
GROUP, LTD., aka SOMERSET GROUP, 
INC.; and GENIE TOTAL PRODUCTS, : 
INC. , 
Defendants. 
This case came before the Court for trial on August 18, 19, 2 0 
and 21, 2003. The Court heard testimony, received numerous 
documents into evidence, and after oral argument, took the matter 
under advisement and now finds and rules as follows: 
On April 6, 2000, the Board of Directors of NexMed, Inc., 
canceled and rescinded the issuance of certain shares of NexMed 
common stock which were then in the name of Somerset Group, Inc. 
Plaintiff seeks a declaratory Judgment in this matter determining 
that it had the right to cancel and rescind said shares. 
Defendants claim that those shares were issued to Somerset Group by 
resolution of NexMed's predecessor, Bioelectric, Inc. (formerly 
Target Capital, Inc.), on April 11, 1994. That resolution purports 
to issue 2.5 million shares to Somerset Group. Those shares were 
subsequently subjected to a 20-for-l reverse split, resulting in 
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125,000 shares from the 2,500,000 shares. Said shares are 
represented by two stock certificates which are now on deposit with 
the clerk of the court pursuant to this Court's Order. 
The Court will not at this time make a lengthy recitation of 
all of the facts giving rise to this action, as many of them are 
undisputed, and are well-known to the parties. The Court will make 
a finding throughout this Memorandum Decision as to those facts 
that are in dispute by the parties and are necessary for a ruling 
in this case. 
Plaintiff's legal theories upon which they claim they were 
justified in canceling and rescinding the shares are as follows: 
1. At the time the disputed shares were issued, the then-
Board of Directors did not, as required by law, determine that the 
consideration to be received for the shares to be issued was 
adequate. Plaintiff relies on Section 78.211 of the Nevada 
Corporation Partnerships and Associations law. NexMed is a Nevada 
corporation. 
The Court notes that the referenced section of Nevada law does 
not provide a specific remedy when a Board, of Directors fails to 
make a determination of the value of the consideration received. 
A related question under this theory for relief and under the other 
theories claimed by plaintiff is whether the corporation received 
adequate consideration for the issuance of the disputed shares. 
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The Court is of the opinion that it would not be the intent of 
the Nevada legislature to allow a corporation to rescind shares 
(especially under circumstances where it had in reality received 
adequate consideration) , simply on the basis of the technical 
argument that Section 78.211(2) had not been complied with. The 
Court therefore is of the opinion that said provision in the Nevada 
statutes, while it imposes a duty upon officers and directors to 
make a determination of consideration in the issuance of shares, 
does not authorize that same corporation to cancel shares it has 
issued, based on its own dereliction of duty in failing to 
determine adequate consideration at the time of issuance. It is 
not necessary for the Court to analyze what remedy is available if 
the Board of Directors does not meet its duty under this provision 
of Nevada law. It is sufficient to determine that the cancellation 
and rescission of shares under this provision is not the 
appropriate remedy under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the 
Court finds in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff on 
the first claim for relief. 
2. Plaintiff's second claim is that the shares should be 
rescinded inasmuch as the issuance was based on an altered 
document. It appears that an initial corporate resolution was 
drafted and adopted by the then-Board of Directors authorizing the 
issuance of the disputed shares to Genie Total Products, Inc., a 
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company controlled by the defendant Clealon Mann. There is 
evidence that a second resolution was adopted authorizing the 
issuance of the same disputed shares to Somerset Group, Inc. There 
is no claim that the 2,500,000 shares issued to Somerset were 
different shares than those issued to Genie Total Products, Inc. 
The evidence is that the shares were initially issued to Genie and 
then for reasons that may not be relevant at this point, it was 
determined that the shares should more appropriately have been 
issued to Somerset, and therefore a correction was made through the 
resolution, which correction then issued the shares to Somerset. 
There is a significant dispute as to how this occurred. There 
appears to be in evidence only one signature page to the 
resolutions, which plaintiff claims suggests that the Board's 
intent was to issue the shares to Genie, and plaintiff implies, 
that someone (presumably, defendant Clealon Mann), changed the 
resolution without authorization from the Board and simply attached 
the same signature page from the first resolution to the second 
resolution. 
All three directors whose signatures are contained on the 
resolution testified. Dr. Peter Lathrop testified that he signed 
two resolutions and authorized issuance of the shares to Somerset 
Group. Mr. Johnson seems not to recall whether he had signed two 
resolutions, but indicated that under the circumstances and at the 
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time it made no difference to him whether the shares went to Genie 
or Somerset. Indeed, the current representative of NexMed 
testified that it made no difference to the company whether the 
shares were held by Genie or Somerset. 
The third director, Cherie Castleberry (whose relationship 
with Dr. Lathrop has subsequently ended), claims that she signed 
only one document authorizing the issuance of shares, and further 
claimed that Mann advised her that the effect of the resolution was 
simply to transfer existing outstanding shares from the name of one 
corporation to another. NexMed, therefore, claims fraud in 
inducing Castleberry to sign the resolution. This claim has not 
been raised in these proceedings, was not reserved in the Pretrial 
Order as a basis for canceling and rescinding the shares, and 
accordingly, the Court has previously ruled that it will not allow 
this claim, based on Cherie Castleberry's testimony. 
The Court finds that the Board authorized the issuance of the 
shares to Somerset Group, Inc. In addition, it is the opinion of 
the Court that it would be unjust to allow cancellation of the 
shares under this claim for relief, inasmuch as the testimony of 
all parties was that it made no difference to NexMed whether the 
shares were held in the name of Genie Total Products, Inc., or 
Somerset Group, Inc. 
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Accordingly, the Court finds against the plaintiff and in 
favor of the defendant on plaintiff's second and third claims as 
set out in the Pretrial Order. 
3. Plaintiff claims that the company did not receive 
adequate consideration for the disputed shares. A related issue is 
plaintiff's fifth claim in the Pretrial Order that at the time of 
the issuance of the disputed shares, defendant, Mann, had a 
controlling interest; in the issuing company, and that therefore the 
defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
company did receive adequate consideration for the shares and that 
the transaction was fair and equitable to the company. This Court 
found at the close of plaintiff's case that it had made a prima 
facie showing that Mann had a controlling interest in Target 
Capital at the critical time that an agreement was reached with 
Lathrop and Johnson, and when a Proxy Statement was prepared 
disclosing the agreement to issue the shares to Mann. The Court 
finds that Mann had control of Target up to the date of the 
shareholders meeting on January 18, 1994. The Court then ruled 
that the burden shifted to Mann to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the transaction was fair and reasonable to Target 
shareholders and that adequate consideration was received for the 
shares. The Court feels that further comment regarding Mr. Mann's 
controlling interest is in order. This ruling by the Court 
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pertaining to Mann's control of Target Capital pertains to the 
period of time that negotiations were underway with Lathrop and 
Johnson for the acquisition of the herpes device, and at the time 
an agreement was reached with Lathrop and Johnson for the issuance 
of the shares to Lathrop, Johnson, Mann and others, and in the 
period of time leading up to the shareholders' meeting of January 
18, 1994, and the preparation of the Proxy Statement just prior 
thereto. The Court finds, however, that after the shareholders' 
meeting of January 18, 1994, when Johnson, Lathrop and Castleberry 
became the Board of Directors, that Mann no longer had control of 
the corporation and did not have control at the time the shares 
were actually issued in April of 1994. 
The central question underlying this claim is whether the 
company received a fair and adequate consideration for the issuance 
of the 2.5 million shares of company stock. Whether adequate 
consideration has been received in a bargain is a very difficult 
and elusive question. What to one person might be adequate 
consideration, because of a host of variables, may not be adequate 
consideration to another (presumably that is why under contract law 
the courts do not make a determination of the adequacy of 
consideration to uphold a contract, but rather the question is 
whether any consideration at all has been received.) One thing is 
clear in this case, and that is that at least two of the three 
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members of the Board of Directors that authorized the issuance of 
these shares in April of 1994 felt that the consideration was 
adequate. 
Whether the consideration was adequate should be analyzed in 
the context of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the 
shares were issued. 
It should be noted, therefore, that at the time Mr. Mann 
purchased Target through Genie Total Products, Inc., Target was a 
shell corporation. That is, it had no assets nor liabilities. It 
essentially had no value. Accordingly, the shares in Target had 
no value. The Court finds that any value that this corporation had 
at the time the shares were issued was due primarily to the efforts 
of Mr. Mann. Mr. Mann was able to bring to the corporation the 
only asset that it had at the time the shares were issued, that is 
to say, the herpes device. Mr. Mann was able to locate and enter 
into an arrangement with the owner and inventor of that device, and 
provide the shell corporation, for the marketing of the device. It 
should also be noted at this point that this device is still a 
viable asset of the company and NexMed currently has plans for its 
marketing. 
It is rather easy for NexMed at this point in time, nine years 
later, to claim that the value of the shares Mr. Mann received are 
disproportionate to the amount of his contribution to the company. 
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However, in 1994, under then-existing circumstances, it appears to 
the Court that Mr. Mann's services and efforts were of significant 
value in kick-starting this company. Dr. Lathrop testified quite 
convincingly that Mann's contribution to the company was 
significant, and probably more significant than the scientists, 
developers, and officers and directors of the company. 
The plaintiff's claim that the company did not receive 
adequate consideration for the issuance of the shares is somewhat 
belied by the fact that the company, including current officers, 
have known since at least June of 1994 that the disputed shares 
were held by Mr. Mann in a company he controlled, and knew the 
precise nature of the consideration the company received for the 
issuance of those shares, and yet waited over six years, and after 
Mr. Mann had filed lawsuits against the company on other matters, 
and had filed a Complaint with the Utah State Bar against the 
company's attorney, to make a claim that the consideration received 
was inadequate. NexMed's representative explained the delay in 
filing this lawsuit by testifying that when Mr. Mann filed his 
Complaint against Mr. Boyack with the Utah State Bar and attached 
certain documents to the Complaint that they had never seen before, 
that they then had all the pieces of the puzzle, and at that time 
felt a lawsuit was appropriate. 
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The document in question that they had not seen before was a 
resolution by the Board, dated in April of 1994, authorizing the 
issuance of 2.5 million shares of the company stock to Somerset 
Group, Inc. This resolution contained a signature page that was 
identical to the signature page on the resolution authorizing the 
issuance of the same shares to Genie Total Products, Inc. (both 
companies controlled by Mr. Mann). (Mr. Throckmorton testified that 
the signature pages, which were copies, were identical and from the 
same source.) 
In the opinion of the Court, this testimony by NexMed's 
representative explaining the timing of this lawsuit was not 
compelling. In the first place, the company has known since April 
of 1994 that the shares were actually issued in the name of 
Somerset Group, Inc., but that the resolution authorized the 
issuance of the shares to Genie Total Products, Inc. Moreover, 
NexMed's representative testified that it really made no difference 
to them whether the shares were issued to Genie Total Products or 
Somerset Group, Inc. The new document that was attached to Mann's 
Complaint with the Utah State Bar was a resolution with the 
signature page discussed above, that authorized the issuance of the 
shares to Somerset Group, Inc. So, what NexMed wants this Court to 
believe is that while they knew of this inconsistency between the 
resolution and the issuance of the shares for the six years prior 
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to the filing of their lawsuit, it was not until they saw a 
document that is consistent with the issuance of the shares to 
Somerset Group, Inc., that they filed this lawsuit. The Court is 
not persuaded by this argument. 
Secondly, this explanation does nothing to explain why NexMed 
waited six years to bring a claim based on inadequate 
consideration. And while the statute of limitations and laches 
defenses pled in the Answer were not preserved in the Pretrial 
Order, nevertheless, the Court feels that this evidence of a 
considerable delay in making a claim of inadequate consideration 
and then only after other claims were made against them, weakens 
NexMed1s claim of inadequate consideration. 
The Court finds that the defendant has proved by the requisite 
burden of proof that the consideration received by the company for 
the shares was adequate and that in the context of the facts and 
circumstances existing in 1993-94, the transaction was fair to the 
shareholders . 
The Court finds that the Asset Purchase Agreement did not bar 
Mr. Mann from entering into an agreement with Target for the 
issuance of the disputed shares. The Court further finds that Mr. 
Mann was never paid any money whatsoever under the Business 
Consulting Agreement, and in any event the existence of that 
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Agreement would not be fatal to Mr. Mann's claim that the shares 
were properly issued. 
The Court therefore finds that the company did receive 
adequate consideration for the disputed shares, and that the 
transaction was fair and equitable to the company, and accordingly 
the Court finds in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff 
on plaintiff's claims four and five in the Pretrial Order. 
In summary, the Court finds in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff on all of plaintiff's claims, and finds that 
NexMed did not have the right to cancel and rescind the shares in 
question. The Court, therefore, nullifies the action of 
plaintiff's Board of Directors in attempting to cancel and rescind 
said shares and orders that the shares be returned to Mr. Mann. 
The Court is aware that other proceedings between these 
parties are pending, and that a criminal investigation may also be 
pending. This has no bearing on the Court's ruling on the narrow 
issue before it in this case. 
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Counsel for defendant is to prepare an appropriate and more 
detailed set of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order 
consistent with this^-Court' s decision. 
Dated this /jO day of August, 2003. 
PRANTCG^-'NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT 
'H4..; 
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